We consider two players'choice about the formation of an alliance ahead of con ‡ict in a framework with incomplete information about the strength of co-players. When deciding on alliance formation, players anticipate the self-selection of other players and the informational value of own and other players'choices. In the absence of these signaling e¤ects, strong players have an incentive to stand alone, which leads to a separating equilibrium. This separating equilibrium can be destabilized by deception incentives if beliefs are updated on the basis of endogenous alliance formation choices. Weak players may …nd it attractive to appear strong in order to deter competitors from positive e¤ort choices. Strong players may …nd it attractive to appear weak in order to give their competitors a false sense of security and then beat them with little e¤ort. Moreover, appearing weak allows players to free-ride when alliances are formed.
Introduction
When players face a con ‡ict and two players can form an alliance with each other, they have to consider what a potential coalition partner is able and willing to contribute to this alliance, and how this a¤ects other players who are not members of the alliance. The players are typically not perfectly symmetric and homogeneous, and their characteristics such as their intentions, their ability or their motivation are often not common knowledge. A motivated and powerful player who may have the opportunity to form an alliance with a weak partner may think about this option di¤erently to a powerless or poorly motivated player who considers the opportunity to join a top team. Often the decisions as to whether to form an alliance must be made under incomplete information on the strength or motivation of other players. In addition to the incentive e¤ects mentioned, two-sided incomplete information adds a further aspect: When the formation of an alliance is a negotiation process, players' behavior in this negotiation may potentially reveal information about a potential alliance partner's characteristics. Players need to take this aspect into consideration, which may a¤ect both the interaction between members of an alliance and the interaction with players outside the alliance.
We provide a microeconomic analysis of alliances in contests in a framework with heterogeneous players and incomplete information about players'strength, if the alliance is the outcome of mutual agreement of its members. Natural examples can be found in a wide spectrum of applications ranging from possible joint ventures in R&D competition to pre-election commitment of candidates or parties in political competition with plurality voting, or international con ‡ict. The speci…cs of the particular con ‡ict in many of these problems provide clear a priori constraints about who may form a coalition/alliance with whom. 1 This consideration makes it seemingly legitimate to side-step a problem that received much attention in the theoretical literature and emerges if a set of n players can form arbitrary alliances which may be arbitrarily composed of the di¤erent players. 2 It reduces the problem to a decision making 1 The starting point of the rivalry analysis by Thompson (2001) is that not all actors are equally likely to clash. A historical process may determine which pair of states sustain a hostile relationship. Similarly, an alliance between some actors may be more likely than between others. 2 Coalition formation in a set-up with arbitrary coalitions between a larger number of players generates interesting, but di¢ cult conceptual issues. Hart and Kurz (1983) were among the …rst to highlight these conceptual issues, particularly the issue of coalition stability. See also Ray and Vohra (1997) , Konishi and Ray (2003) , and Ray and Vohra (2015) for more recent contributions. problem whether speci…c players would like to form an alliance or not. In turn, this allows us to highlight the role of information about players'strength. From a formal perspective our analysis borrows the a-priori feasibility constraint from the generic framework of Esteban and Sákovics (2003) with three players, in which two speci…c players may be in an alliance or not. We endogenize the choice of these two players whether to form an alliance, and, compared to the theory considerations in Herbst et al. (2015) , we allow for, and focus on incomplete information. For describing the possible con ‡ict, we use the theory of all-pay contests as developed by Hillman and Riley (1989) , Baye et al. (1996) and Siegel (2009) as the main tool. 3 This theory de…nes the basic rules of a con ‡ict game in which players compete for a valuable resource by expending non-recoverable e¤orts, and for which the set of e¤ort choices translates deterministically in an allocation of the prize.
Experimental evidence suggests that information aspects and players'heterogeneity matter for alliance formation decisions and contest behavior. Under controlled laboratory conditions, human players seemingly di¤er in their motivation to expend e¤ort in a contest for a given and uniform monetary prize. As shown by Herbst et al. (2015) these expenditure attitudes are correlated with the players' choices on whether to join an alliance: Players who expend relatively little e¤ort are more willing to join an alliance than players who expend much e¤ort. Our framework here analyses these selection e¤ects theoretically, explicitly accounting for incomplete information. It allows for a clear distinction between pure selection e¤ects and information transmission e¤ects of alliance formation decisions.
In a …rst approach we isolate pure selection e¤ects: Players who di¤er in their motivation to expend e¤ort make their choices about alliance formation, but can safely disregard the informational value of the o¤ers they make in these negotiations. In a …rst approach we assume that the players'motivation becomes fully revealed to all players once the alliance formation stage is completed. While this is a less plausible assumption, it allows us to isolate the selection e¤ects. Negotiation o¤ers may be informative, but the information has no additional value given that all information asymmetries are removed at a later stage of the game. We …nd strong selection e¤ects and separating equilibria in which strongly motivated players stand alone, whereas poorly motivated players have a preference to form an alliance.
In a second step we change the framework such that alliance formation choices have informational value. We remove the mechanism by which all information is exogenously revealed at the contest stage. Considerations about potential information revelation in the negotiations for alliance formation become relevant and weaken the selection …ndings. The parameter range shrinks in which the separating equilibrium exists. This change is due to e¤ects that generate mimicking incentives for both the strong players and the poorly motivated players. Poorly motivated players have an incentive to appear strong in order to discourage competitors from risking an attack. But also strong players may …nd it attractive to mimic poorly motivated players and to take by surprise the competitors who underestimate the strength of their rival and think they are …ghting an easy target. Moreover, when entering into an alliance, appearing weak reduces the own burden of contributing.
This work is related to the literature on the role of alliances in con ‡ict in economics more generally, surveyed by Konrad (2014) , and in biology, surveyed by Bissonette et al. (2015) . The seminal paper at the interface between economics and political science is Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) . This paper and much of the literature it has inspired focuses on the disadvantages of free-riding in alliances. 4 We adopt the key assumptions of this literature: Members of an alliance choose their individual contributions to alliance e¤ort individually and non-cooperatively, but these contributions add up to aggregate resources in a contest with an outside adversary. A seminal paper on the advantages of alliance formation is Skaperdas (1998) . He considers a complete information framework and concludes that, due to the free-riding incentives they generate, alliances are not formed unless the technological advantages of …ghting in an alliance are su¢ ciently large. We do not assume such technological advantages. 5 We also do not consider other potential synergies (as in Roberson 2012 or Konrad and Kovenock 2009 ). We show, however, 4 This argument strongly draws on the theory of private provision of public goods as analyzed by Bergstrom et al. (1986) , Nitzan (1991) , Davis and Reilly (1999) , and Esteban and Ray (2001) . 5 Sub-or supermodularity of the alliance members'e¤orts are interesting and relevant aspects of alliances, but these aspects are orthogonal to the informational aspects we study. Supermodularity and e¤ort complementarity plays an important role in the literature on R&D competition (see Vives 2005 for an overview).
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that an alliance may be formed even in the absence of such synergies. One reason we identify is that the formation of an alliance causes a common pool problem and makes its members to reduce their e¤orts (free riding), which, in turn makes the outside competitor moderate his e¤ort. The bene…ts of this moderation can exceed the disadvantages from the common pool problem.
The e¤ect of strategic e¤ort moderation is reminiscent of di¤erent types of strategic commitment by which players restrain their future contest e¤ort in order to moderate competitors' e¤ort, as found by Kolmar and Wagener (2013) in the context of the Tullock (1980) lottery contest. In their framework the strategic commitment toward moderation is obtained from choosing intra-group incentives to free-ride; such commitment may be useful because it can moderate the competitive behavior of rival groups. They also discuss related contexts in which strategic moderation occurs: Stackelberg leadership (Baik and Shogren 1992) and strategic delegation ). We focus on ex ante heterogeneous players and aspects of incomplete information in the context of the all-pay contest. In our framework, the formation of an alliance is endogenous and hinges on players'types, which are private information. 6 The alliance may bring about strategic bene…ts from moderation, but these are asymmetrically distributed between weak and strong players. We also identify a strategic incentive of weak players which is contrary to moderation: Weak players may attempt to appear strong in order to deter other players from entering into a competition.
Our paper is also related to the literature on all-pay contests under incomplete information. 7 Typically this literature does not consider the role of alliances. Recent exceptions are Konrad (2012) and Malueg and Zhang (2015) . Both papers consider 'information alliances,' that is, all-pay contests in which a subset of players can exchange their private information prior to the contest (where, then, each player competes on his own). They show that sharing information among a subset of players can make these players strictly better o¤; the out-group may bene…t or lose from 6 The experiment by Herbst et al. (2015) also o¤er a theoretical analysis of the Tullock (1980) lottery contest that corresponds to their experimental setup, assuming, however, that all decisions are made under perfect and complete information. 7 Standard references are Weber (1985) , Hillman and Riley (1989) , and Amann and Leininger (1996) . For models of imperfectly discriminating contests with incomplete information see, for instance, Hurley and Shogren (1998), Malueg and Yates (2004) , and Wasser (2013). Recent work by Kovenock, Morath and Münster (2015) and Serena (2015) considers incentives to inform other contestants about the valuations of winning in incomplete information all-pay contests. such information sharing agreements. A main di¤erence between Malueg and Zhang (2015) and Konrad (2012) is that the latter focuses on contestants which highly constrained budgets. The idea of information alliances is also closely related to our analysis in Section 3 which includes the case in which alliance formation additionally involves information exchange among alliance players.
Most of the literature on alliances in contests focuses on exogenously formed alliances and compares contest outcomes with or without an alliance. We make the formation decision an endogenous choice. This is an important di¤erence, as the alliance formation choice materially depends on the distribution of types in the population and is an equilibrium outcome, not a comparative static comparison between two exogenously given situations. Since players self-select when making this choice, the composition of types inside the alliance is a result of this endogeneity.
The formal analysis 2.1 The model framework
Consider a contest with three players A, B, and C. The three players compete for one given prize in an all-pay contest. Player C is a stand-alone player. Players A and B may stand alone but also have the option to form an alliance at a stage which precedes the contest stage. More precisely, Stage 1 is the coalition formation stage in which players A and B simultaneously choose whether they want to enter into an alliance. The alliance formation choice of player i 2 fA; Bg is denoted by i 2 f1; 0g, where i = 1 means that i opts favorably for the formation of the alliance and i = 0 means that i opts against alliance formation. Once the choices A and B are made, they become common knowledge and the alliance formation process is completed. The alliance is formed if A = B = 1 and it is not formed otherwise, that is, the alliance is formed if and only if both players A and B want to enter into an alliance. Otherwise, all three players stand alone. Now players enter into Stage 2, which is the contest stage. Players compete in an all-pay contest without noise. Each player i 2 fA; B; Cg chooses a non-negative e¤ort denoted by x i 0. Choices are made simultaneously and independently. Note that we assume that none of the players is constrained by some …nite budget or highest 6 possible e¤ort. 8 The e¤orts, together with the outcome of the alliance formation stage, determine the players'payo¤s.
The contest is about a prize to be attributed to one of the players, but players can have di¤erent valuations of the prize. Player C's prize valuation is V C = M and is common knowledge. The prize valuation V i of player i 2 fA; Bg is drawn from the set fH; Lg with probabilities
where q 2 (0; 1). This probability distribution is the same for V A and V B and is common knowledge. At the beginning of Stage 1, V A and V B are drawn independently from this distribution; player i 2 fA; Bg privately learns his valuation V i . At the beginning of stage 2, and prior to players'contest e¤ort choices, the true valuations V A and V B also become common knowledge. 9 The most interesting case to consider is the case where 10 0 < L < M < H:
In Stage 2, if no alliance is formed then A, B and C compete in a standard three-player all-pay contest, and their e¤orts decide who wins. The expected payo¤ of player i 2 fA; B; Cg is given by
Hence, the player with the highest e¤ort wins the prize; all others lose. If several players choose the same highest e¤ort, the winner is determined as an outcome of a symmetric lottery between the players expending the same, highest e¤ort. Independent of winning or losing, each player i incurs a cost of e¤ort which is normalized to the e¤ort itself. 8 This rules out that tight budgets and the desire to overcome a liquidity problem by single players is the motivation for alliance formation. Konrad and Kovenock (2009) consider the case with tight e¤ort budgets, in which alliance formation may have the purpose of overcoming the too-tight budget constraints of single players. 9 This assumption will be relaxed in Section 3. 10 As will become clear below, alliance formation is always bene…cial if M > H (since players A and B get zero expected payo¤s if no alliance is formed). The case of M < L requires additional case distinctions but can be analyzed analogously to the subsequent analysis of this section and yields similar conclusions.
If an alliance is formed then the e¤orts of players A and B add to the alliance e¤ort: x A +x B . This additivity is common in the literature on the voluntary provision of public goods more generally. 11 Additivity of e¤orts is assumed here to isolate the strategic aspects of alliance formation from possible technological e¤ects. 12 In the contest the alliance e¤ort x A + x B is compared with the e¤ort x C . Expected payo¤s are
then victory is attributed to players A and B each with probability 1=4 and to player C with probability 1=2. The speci…c tie-breaking probability choices are convenient but not crucial for the results.
We now solve the game recursively. At Stage 2 the true valuations are common knowledge. The players participate in what can be considered a standard all-pay contest with complete information. If A and B have not formed an alliance, Stage 2 is a three-player all-pay contest with linear e¤ort costs and with prize valuations (V A ; V B ; V C ). If A and B entered into an alliance and compete jointly against C, this contest structure is also well-known from the literature. We need to distinguish between these two possible continuation games.
The equilibrium in the continuation games
The continuation game without an alliance has an equilibrium that is known from the literature on the all-pay auction, as characterized by Baye et al. (1996) . The equilib- Table 1 : Expected payo¤s of players A, B, and C in the three-player stand-alone allpay auction, as a function of the valuations of A and B, assuming that the valuation
rium e¤orts and payo¤s depend on the combinations of V A and V B . The equilibrium is in mixed strategies in which non-active players choose zero e¤ort and active players randomize on the equilibrium support. This equilibrium solution is well-known and we focus on the payo¤s. 13 While there is a multiplicity in the equilibrium mixed strategies for V A = V B = L < V C , all equilibria lead to the same expected payo¤s.
Using the results in Baye et al. (1996, Theorems 1 and 2) we obtain the unique equilibrium expected payo¤s for the di¤erent prize valuations as summarized in Table  1 .
In the equilibrium the player with the highest valuation receives a payo¤ equal to the di¤erence between his valuation and the second-highest valuation. All other players receive zero. Intuitively, the player with the highest valuation can guarantee this payo¤ to himself by bidding marginally above the second-highest valuation. While the equilibrium is not in pure strategies, this argument already explains why the payo¤ cannot be lower than the di¤erence between the two highest valuations.
We turn next to the situation with coalition formation. If an alliance is formed then the members of the coalition jointly contribute to the total alliance e¤ort x A + x B , which is a common good for the alliance. Each alliance player i has a bene…t of V i =2 in expectation if the alliance wins. In the appendix, we characterize an 
equilibrium of the contest between an alliance of A and B on one side and the stand-alone player C on the other, and we show that the following result holds:
Proposition 1 Suppose that players A and B form an alliance and have valuations for the prize equal to V A and V B , respectively. Then, the symmetric equilibrium payo¤s of the continuation game in Stage 2 are as summarized in Table 2 .
A proof of Proposition 1 is in the appendix. The payo¤s in the continuation games are only instrumental for the main Proposition 2 and follow from conventional reasoning using the theory of the all-pay contest. There are several cornerstones of the analysis that lead to these results. First, the alliance players' valuation of winning is reduced to one half of their respective full valuation of the prize, as the prize is divided between the alliance members if the alliance wins. Second, we make extensive use of the result that if V A < B B , for instance, alliance member A prefers to make no contribution to the alliance e¤ort (i.e., x A = 0), given the e¤ort choices by C which are a necessary condition for equilibrium. This simpli…es the equilibrium of the remaining contest to the equilibrium of a standard all-pay contest with two players and prize valuations V B =2 and V C . Third, if V A = V B , we assume symmetry in the expected payo¤s of players A and B. Here, the standard logic of the all-pay contest determines only the e¤ort choice by C and the sum of e¤orts chosen by A and B; there remains, however, discretion about how the two players divide this alliance e¤ort between them. 14 Therefore, if V A = V B , we assume that A and B randomize who is in the active role and who is in the passive role. The active player then competes with C and the passive player chooses zero e¤ort (and prefers to do so, given the other players'equilibrium strategies). Assuming that both players A and B are in the active role with probability 1=2, this leads to symmetric expected payo¤s for A and B in case of V A = V B . 15 For a further and more detailed discussion of this choice see Appendix A.1.
One of the surprising insights from the payo¤s summarized in Table 2 is that alliance players do well compared to stand-alone play (see Table 1 ). Even when V A = V B = L < V C , and even though this generates a free-rider problem inside the alliance, the members of the alliance achieve a positive expected payo¤. The intuition behind this result is that players bene…t from the possibility to free-ride within the alliance. If V A = V B = L then one of the players becomes the active player and gets an expected payo¤ of zero in equilibrium. The other, passive player, however, can free-ride and enjoys a windfall; the passive player j's expected payo¤ is V j =2, multiplied by the probability that the active alliance player will win against player C. Note that the formation of an alliance comes with a reduction in the e¤orts of A and B, which is complemented by a reduction in the expected e¤ort by the stand-alone player C. This strategic e¤ect bene…ts players A and B, even for 16 But players can also lose when forming an alliance, compared to the three-player stand-alone all-pay contest. Whether they gain or lose depends on their own valuation of winning relative to the valuation of the other alliance member, and on the valuation of the stronger alliance player compared to the valuation of the stand-alone player C. While weak players (with V i = L) always gain in expectation from the formation of the alliance, strong players (with V i = H) lose when forming an alliance with a weak player, compared to stand-alone play. But strong players tend to gain when forming an alliance with another strong player. Therefore, under incomplete information about the co-player's type, this causes players'self-selection to depend on the anticipated self-selection of other players. Before turning to this question, note that the stand-alone player C generally bene…ts from the formation of the alliance: His expected payo¤ (weakly) increases compared to no alliance formation since the alliance players'incentives to win are weakened.
Alliance formation decisions
When A and B decide whether they are willing to enter into an alliance ( i = 1) or not ( i = 0), they anticipate the contest outcomes that emerge in the continuation games for all possible combinations of prize valuations. They also anticipate that an alliance is formed if and only if both players opt for it, that is, ( A ; B ) = (1; 1). When deciding on alliance formation, player i 2 fA; Bg knows his own valuation V i and the probability distribution of the valuation of j 2 fA; Bg, j 6 = i, that is, i knows that V j = H with probability q and V j = L with probability 1 q. The players also know that the true prize valuations of all players will become common knowledge once players enter into the contest stage. 17 We state the equilibrium choices in the next proposition that is the …rst main result: Proposition 2 For the equilibrium continuation payo¤s characterized in Tables 1 and 2, the following choices characterize perfect Bayesian equilibrium behavior in reduction in the competitor's e¤ort choice; the overall e¤ect is bene…cial for the player who hires the delegate with a low valuation. 17 The complete information assumption about the contest stage is important. It avoids all the complications emerging from how the alliance formation choices are interpreted by the di¤erent players, in particular, how the choices a¤ect players' beliefs about other players' true valuations of the prize. The common knowledge assumption in Stage 2 makes the second stage of the game straightforward and it separates self-selection e¤ects from signaling aspects.
for H > 2M , this equilibrium exists if
an alliance is formed with probability 1 q (that is, if V j = L) and a stand-alone contest emerges with probability q. Since the players' types are revealed at the contest stage, deviations in stage 1 only a¤ect the choice of the continuation game but do not in ‡uence the contest payo¤s in the respective continuation games. Thus, using Tables 1 and 2 , i's expected payo¤ in the candidate equilibrium is strictly positive, but i gets zero when deviating to i = 0 in which case a stand-alone contest emerges with probability one. Consider next player i with V i = H. Since i = 0 triggers a stand-alone contest, i's expected payo¤ in the candidate equilibrium is zero if V j = H and is equal to Table 1 ). If i deviates to i = 1, he correctly anticipates that this deviation becomes relevant if and only if V j = L. Thus, he still gets zero if V j = H (in the subsequent stand-alone contest) and gets maxfH=2 M; 0g if V j = L, in which case an alliance is formed. Comparing the expected payo¤s under i = 0 and i = 1 shows that i strictly prefers i = 0 if V i = H. Altogether, this yields the "type-1"equilibrium which is supported by equilibrium beliefs that j = 1 if V j = L and j = 0 if V j = H.
Part (ii): Since players i with V i = L get zero payo¤ in the stand-alone contest but a strictly positive expected payo¤ when an alliance is formed, weak players do not want to deviate from the candidate equilibrium. Hence, consider a strong player with V i = H and consider …rst the case of H 2M . In the candidate equilibrium, i correctly anticipates that an alliance is formed with probability one, which yields an expected payo¤ equal to q 1 16
since V j = H with probability q and V j = L with probability 1 q. If i deviates to i = 0, a stand-alone contest emerges (independent of j ) in which i's expected payo¤ is equal to q0 + (1 q) (H M ) (compare Table 1 ). 18 Thus, i does not want to deviate from the candidate equilibrium if and only if (1) holds. Now consider the choice of player i with V i = H in case of H > 2M . In the candidate equilibrium, i's expected payo¤ is
If i deviates to i = 0, then a stand-alone contest emerges in which i's expected deviation payo¤ is again q0
Thus, i does not want to deviate from i = 1 if and only if (2) holds. The "type-2" equilibrium is supported by beliefs that j = 1 both for V j = L and for V j = H. Note that the conditions (1) and (2) for existence of the type-2 equilibrium are more likely to be ful…lled if q is large. Proposition 2 characterizes two types of pure-strategy equilibria. These suggest that weak players may like to join an alliance, whereas strong players are more inclined to stand alone. 19 Strong players may either never join an alliance, even though weak players do (Proposition 2(i)), or they may like to join an alliance, but only if additional conditions are ful…lled (Proposition 2(ii)). 20 This result is in line with the experimental …ndings by Herbst et al. (2015) . 21 The equilibria in Proposition 2 o¤er insights into the incentives of players as regards the formation of an alliance. One e¤ect is a direct disincentive e¤ect of alliance formation. Players who enter into an alliance have to "share" the prize of winning (where sharing occurs here in a probabilistic sense). This makes winning less attractive and reduces their general motivation to expend e¤ort. For players with a low valuation this disincentive e¤ect is not a major cost since they already expect zero payo¤ in the three-player stand-alone contest. In contrast, the disincentive e¤ect is a true disadvantage for a player who is the only player with the highest valuation of the prize. His expected payo¤ is high in the three-player stand-alone contest (equal to the di¤erence between his and the second-highest prize valuation), but the disincentive from prize-sharing makes this player a much weaker competitor in an alliance and tends to reduce his payo¤.
However, there is also a less obvious, bene…cial e¤ect from alliance formation: The alliance players are substitutes in making e¤ort contributions. As a consequence, they contribute less e¤ort in expectation and win with lower probability. But anticipating the free-riding problem within the alliance, the stand-alone player C also expends less e¤ort. This strategic e¤ect on C's e¤ort mitigates the decrease in the alliance's win probability. For weak players, the positive e¤ect of lower e¤ort cost dominates the lower win probability such that the overall e¤ect of alliance formation is always positive. For strong players, the overall e¤ect of alliance formation is positive if and only if the probability that their alliance partner is also a strong type is su¢ ciently high. In this case, alliance formation helps avoid the …erce competition with other strong players in stand-alone contests, and alliance members enjoy a windfall from a similar e¤ort moderation e¤ect that makes alliance formation the dominant choice for weak players. However, strong players dislike the formation of an alliance with a weak player as the weak player free-rides on them. Figure 1 illustrates the parameter range in which strong players, under incomplete information on the strength of their possible co-player in the alliance, can be willing to enter into an alliance. For this purpose we set M = 1 and consider variations of H and q. The range in which the equilibrium of "type 2" (Proposition 2(ii)) exists is the range above this curve.
The free-riding within the alliance can be considered as a commitment to expend lower e¤ort which also makes the stand-alone player C less aggressive. But the existence of the two types of equilibria in Proposition 2 does not qualitatively depend on the assumption that the alliance players will choose their e¤orts non-cooperatively and thus commit to low e¤orts. In Section 4 we show that similar results can be obtained in case we assume that an alliance, if formed, maximizes joint expected payo¤s E ( A ) + E ( B ).
Deterrence and Moderation
The previous section demonstrated the players' motivations to self-select into an alliance or into stand-alone outcomes, basing their choices on expectations of whether the co-players will be strong or weak. Strategic considerations about the information value of alliance formation choices were absent, as players'true types became publicly observable at a later stage. This section focuses on the self-selection of strong and weak players if incomplete information in Stage 2 leads to strategic considerations about the informational value of alliance formation o¤ers. In this case, players need to update their prior beliefs about their co-players'types on the basis of their alliance choices and may compete in Stage 2 in a contest with (at least partially) incomplete information about other players'types.
We consider a game that di¤ers from the previously studied game in exactly one important aspect: There is no exogenous information revelation between Stage 1 and Stage 2. Even though the distinction is not very substantial for the qualitative results, for the formal analysis we need to distinguish between two cases. One case has an information exchange inside the alliance. More formally, players A and B can observe each other's type if and only if A = B = 1. 22 The second case has no such intra-alliance information exchange. Players may update their beliefs about A and B's type, but incomplete information remains even between the members of an alliance if an alliance is formed. More formally, player C's valuation is common knowledge, but player A and player B's valuations are their private information. All three players must form beliefs about the types of players whose valuation is private information, and these beliefs can depend on ( A ; B ).
Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest becomes di¢ cult if more than two heterogeneous players are partially informed about each other, and no general solutions for this case exist. 23 As our main interest is in the question whether strong players may self-select into stand-alone play and whether the insight in Proposition 2 is robust in a framework in which the choices ( A ; B ) in ‡uence players'beliefs, we concentrate on the characterization of separating equilibrium with this property. 24;25 Proposition 3 (i) Suppose that players who are jointly in an alliance can observe each other's valuations. Then there is a perfect Bayesian separating equilibrium in 22 Intra-alliance information exchange is a seemingly natural assumption. Players who form an alliance may mutually learn about their types. In political sciences, Bearce et al. (2006) argue that alliances may serve the purpose of internal information exchange. Similarly, it seems natural to assume that the formation of alliances in other areas such as R&D joint ventures also increases the information ‡ow between the players who enter into an alliance. Konrad (2012) analyzes the role of information exchange in contests between players with tight budget constraints. 23 For results in a framework with two players see Amann and Leininger (1996) , Konrad (2004) , and Morath and Münster (2013). 24 Note that the "trivial" equilibrium with A = B = 0 continues to exist (since players cannot individually induce the formation of an alliance) but remains unstable. The choice of i can, however, in ‡uence beliefs about players' types; thus, the existence of the "trivial" equilibrium requires appropriate o¤-equilibrium beliefs. 25 Note that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which i = 0 if V i = L and i = 1 if V i = H still does not exist in this framework. While the choices of ( A ; B ) would be fully revealing in this candidate equilibrium, weak types would be strictly better o¤ when deviating to alliance formation. ( 3) and 
Proof. If all players believe that the other player's choice j is truthful and fully revealing, we need to prove that deviations from the candidate equilibrium are not pro…table for the players given these beliefs. First we state as a benchmark the equilibrium expected payo¤s of A and B conditional on their valuation. Then we determine deviation payo¤s and compare the benchmark payo¤s with the deviation payo¤s.
Consider the benchmark payo¤s in the candidate equilibrium, which are the same for cases (i) and (ii) in Proposition 3. If all players'choices are truthful, all players enter stage 2 as in an all-pay contest with complete information. Suppose …rst that V i = H, i 2 fA; Bg. Then, i = 0 and stage 2 is an all-pay contest among three stand-alone players. Here, i's expected payo¤ is zero if j = 0 (and V j = H) for j 2 fA; Bg, j 6 = i. Expected payo¤ is equal to H M if j = 1 (and V j = L). Thus, player i's expected payo¤ at stage 1 when j has not yet been chosen is
Along similar lines, if V i = L and i = 1, then i's expected payo¤ in Stage 1 when j has not been chosen is
Part (i): Suppose that A and B can observe each other's valuation if they are in an alliance. (a) Let V i = L but i = 0. Then a three-player stand-alone contest emerges in which the deviating player i is mistakenly taken by j and C as a player with V i = H. The deviating player i's e¤ort choice x i in this contest depends on the type of player j which is truthfully revealed by j's choice of j .
(aa) If j = 0, then i expects F j (x j ) = x j =H in the equilibrium support x j 2 [0; H], and x C 0. Player i's optimal reply to these e¤ort choices is x i 0, yielding a deviation payo¤ of zero.
(ab) If j = 1, then i expects x j 0 and F C (x) = (1 M=H +x=H) for x 2 [0; M ]. For x i = 0, i's expected payo¤ depends on the tie-breaking rule since C chooses zero e¤ort with strictly positive probability. For x i > 0, we get
Thus, i would like to choose a minimal amount of e¤ort to win at least with the probability that x C = 0. To avoid the problem of the non-existence of a best reply function for i in a continuous strategy space, we assume that ties are broken in favor of player i in this case, which yields an optimal deviation e¤ort of i equal to x i = 0 and an expected deviation payo¤ equal to (1 M=H) L. 26 At the point when j has not been chosen, i's expected deviation payo¤ is thus
Comparing (6) and (7) shows that a player i with V i = L does not want to deviate from i = 1 if and only if L 16M H M H :
Then i is mistakenly perceived by C as a player with V i = L. The belief of j about i depends on whether an alliance is formed, which, again, depends on j .
(ba) If j = 0 (and hence V j = H) then a three-player stand-alone contest emerges. In this contest i correctly expects to compete against one player j with V j = H and one player C with V C = M . Players j and C mistakenly think that V i = L and hence expect x i 0; by Baye et al. (1996) , the equilibrium mixed strategies of j and C are F j (x j ) = x j =M and F C (x C ) = 1 (M=H) + (x C =H) with equilibrium support [0; M ]. The best response of the deviating player i to these anticipated choices is x i = M and leads to a payo¤ of (H M ).
(bb) If instead j = 1 (and hence V j = L) then the alliance is formed. Both i and j learn of each other's type (V i = H, V j = L). Player C expects to play against an alliance with V A = V B = L. The equilibrium that emerges based on these beliefs has F C (x C ) = x C =(L=2), x j = 0, and x i = L=2. Since the alliance wins with probability one, i's payo¤ is H=2 L=2. Thus, i's expected deviation payo¤ at the point where j has not yet been chosen is
Comparing (5) and (9) shows that deviations for players i with V i = H are not pro…table if and only if
Altogether, the separating equilibrium exists for parameters (H; M; L; q) if and only if (3) and (4) hold. This set can be shown to be non-empty, which we do when o¤ering an intuitive interpretation.
Part (ii):
Consider now the case without intra-alliance information sharing. Recall that the expected benchmark payo¤s in the candidate equilibrium are given by (5) and (6) . (a) Let V i = L but i = 0. As no alliance is formed, the expected deviation payo¤ is as in part (i), case (a). Accordingly, player i with V i = L does not want to deviate from i = 1 if and only if (8) 
Then i is mistakenly perceived by j and C as a player with V i = L. Whether or not an alliance forms depends on j , that is, on V j .
(ba) If j = 0 (and hence V j = H) then no alliance is formed and the deviation payo¤ is as in part (i), case (ba) and equal to (H M ).
(bb) If j = 1 (and hence V j = L) then the alliance is formed. Player i correctly expects to be in an alliance with a player with V j = L against player C with V C = M . In contrast to part (i), no information transfer inside the alliance takes place and both C and j (mistakenly) think that V i = L. To describe the equilibrium given these beliefs and true valuations, we follow the equilibrium considerations for a correlated equilibrium inside the alliance as already used for the benchmark payo¤s (compare Proposition 1). Player C's equilibrium strategy is F C (x C ) = x C = (L=2). From the point of view of j, the coordination device applies. If j is chosen as the passive player (with probability 1=2), i's best reply to x j = 0 and F C is x i = L=2, which ensures victory. Hence, conditional on being chosen as the active player, i's maximized deviation payo¤^ i is^
With the remaining probability 1=2, player i is chosen to be the passive alliance player. The active player j randomizes according to F j (x) = 1 (L=2) =M + x=M . We search for player i's best reply, given that C randomizes according to F C and j randomizes according to F j (x). If i chooses x i = 0, the alliance may only win if x j > 0 and i's expected deviation payo¤ i is
:
x i , and with probability one if x j L 2
x i . Thus, the probability that the alliance wins is
and i's expected deviation payo¤ for x i 2 0; L 2 is given by i ( x i j i passive) = Pr (alliance wins;F C ; F j ; x i )
Note …rst that (11) is continuous in x i and approaches LH= (8M ) for x i ! 0 and approaches (H L) =2 for x i ! L=2. Moreover, x i = L=2 is strictly preferred to all x i > L=2 (since for x i = L=2 the alliance wins with probability one). Since i will always choose x i > 0. Due to strict concavity of i in x i , the optimal choice is equal to x i = L=2 if and only if
Otherwise, the optimal choice is obtained by the …rst-order condition, which yields x i = M (H L) =H. Inserting i's optimal e¤ort choice into (11) yields
Summing up, the expected deviation payo¤ of
Now we compare i's payo¤ in the candidate equilibrium with the expected deviation payo¤. If 2M (H L) LH 0, we …nd that
as in (4). If 2M (H L) LH < 0, then E( i ) E ( i ) if and only if
Equilibrium in all-pay contests typically is in mixed strategies, and the equilibrium outcomes in this proposition are no exception. This makes the equilibrium play of two players A and B in a coalition a particular challenge. Their e¤orts sum up to the alliance e¤ort, and to allocate the prize, this sum needs to be compared with the e¤ort chosen by the outside player C. To make this player C indi¤erent as regards his e¤ort, the sum of e¤orts by A and B needs to follow a particular distribution. This distribution, in turn, is must be generated from the randomization choices of A and B. In the proof of Proposition 3 we solved this conceptual issue and used a simple coordination device of A and B that allows them to determine who expends e¤ort and who does not, and it is not possible to avoid some structural assumption at this point. Similar coordination devices have been applied in inter-group all-pay contests by Konrad and Kovenock (2009) and Konrad and Leininger (2011) .
We can compare the fully separating self-selection equilibrium in Propositions 2 and 3, for which i = 0 if and only if V i = H. This comparison shows that no parameter restrictions are needed for the existence of this equilibrium if the true valuations are exogenously revealed once the alliance formation choices are made and before players enter the all-pay contest (Proposition 2(i)). The range of existence of this equilibrium is more limited if the alliance formation choice carries informational value such that these choices A and B are used to update beliefs (Proposition 3). Unlike many incentive problems where only one type aims at mimicking the other type, players with valuations L and H both have an incentive to deceive the other players, which makes the problem non-standard. A weak player may want to appear strong for reasons of deterrence, and a strong player may want to appear weak for reasons of moderation. Even though the game structure and the information assumptions are quite di¤erent, these considerations are reminiscent of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) whose seminal paper studies strategic investment in an entry game. There, players prefer to deter others from entry, but would like to soften competition once entry has occurred. In our framework, a weak player A (with V A = L) gains by being perceived as a strong player: In the subsequent three-player stand-alone contest, this makes C "exit" (that is, abstain from expending positive e¤ort) with a positive probability; moreover, B also abstains from expending positive e¤ort if V B = L. This incentive is larger the larger the ratio between H and M , as this ratio determines C's equilibrium exit probability. A strong player A (with V A = H) gains when being perceived as a weak player: He bene…ts from the bid moderation of C that is induced if an alliance with B is formed, and A deceives a strong player B in the case of stand-alone play. In the latter case, B believes that A is weak and bids only a small amount, thinking that this will be enough to win. This, in turn, gives A the opportunity to win against B and C with comparatively little e¤ort.
The deception incentives both for weak and for strong players are quite strong and the conditions in Proposition 3 narrow down the parameter set that describes the existence of the separating equilibrium. However, the parameter set is nonempty. To see this, let q become very small, in which case condition (4) becomes (H + L) =2 M 0. Figure 2 illustrates the separating hyperplanes that determine the parameter range for which the separating equilibrium exists, normalizing M = 1. For the regime with information exchange inside the alliance (Proposition 3(i)), this 
Collusive Alliances
The main analysis makes a number of assumptions. This section discusses the sensitivity of our results. One important aspect we look at is what is meant by an alliance and how members of an alliance coordinate their e¤orts.
In the previous sections, an alliance changes the rules about how the prize is awarded, but the interaction remains fully non-cooperative and each player remains an independent strategic decision maker. This assumption about non-cooperative e¤ort contributions is grounded in much of the work on alliances that was inspired by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) . However, alliances may sometimes, and to some extent, succeed in installing a governance structure to overcome free-riding, such that the alliance can act as one strategic player. In this case the alliance chooses aggregate alliance e¤ort so as to maximize the collective bene…t of the alliance. In addition, such a governance structure must determine the rules by which the prize is allocated inside the alliance, how the aggregate e¤ort is assigned to the alliance members, whether or not alliance members may be able to make side payments and, in our context, what is the information structure inside the alliance and between the alliance and the stand-alone player in case an alliance is formed. This shows that departures from the classical free-riding approach may lead to one of a whole set of di¤erent structures.
To see that the results need not change dramatically for such a departure, we study collusive alliances for one set of assumptions. More precisely, we assume as in Section 2 that signaling aspects are absent: The valuations of players A and B (which are private information in Stage 1) become common knowledge at the contest stage. Moreover, just as in the previous sections, we assume that in case the alliance wins, player A and B each receives the prize with probability 1=2, just as in the previous sections. Finally, we assume that the expected payo¤s of both A and B are non-negative and that symmetric players (with V A = V B ) contribute symmetrically to alliance e¤ort. Details on Remark 1 are in the appendix. Note that the joint payo¤ maximization of alliance players does not necessarily increase the total expected payo¤ of players A and B when forming an alliance. On the contrary, if alliance players are rather weak then the disincentive e¤ect and the free-riding possibilities within the alliance make them achieve a strictly higher payo¤ than if alliance players "cooperated"and maximized joint payo¤s. As in a number of other contexts (e.g., Salant et al. 1983 ), the transformation of two independent strategic players into one strategic player is not necessarily to the advantage of these players.
More importantly, the qualitative predictions of Proposition 2 are reinforced for collusive alliances. In particular, there is an equilibrium where weak types select into alliances and strong types select into stand-alone contests. Moreover, if the share of high types is su¢ ciently large then there is an additional equilibrium in which players A and B enter into an alliance independently of their respective type. 27 This suggests that the intuition about particularly strong players being better-o¤ standing alone is a more robust result that emerges for several sets of assumptions that can be made in the context of alliance formation.
Conclusions
A strong intuition suggests that relative strength matters for players who are considering whether to form an alliance. Weak players may expect to gain from joining an alliance with stronger players. Strong players may consider it more attractive to stand alone: Within an alliance, the stronger player may have to contribute the lion's share in e¤ort, and the winner prize may have to be shared with the weaker alliance member. We show that this intuition is correct in the context of all-pay auctions with incomplete information. A more surprising e¤ect emerges in case two players of equal strength …nd themselves together in an alliance, …ghting against a stand-alone player. To …ght as members of an alliance does not turn two weak players into a stronger player. Rather, it weakens them further in terms of the total e¤ort they can mobilize. Where the free-rider problem may seem to be an additional disadvantage, it turns into an advantage in the all-pay contest: It not only reduces the contest e¤ort of the alliance members but also moderates the e¤ort expended by their joint competitor. Overall, the alliance wins less often but has a higher expected payo¤ than if both weak players stand alone. Also, the formation of an alliance weakens two equally strong players and can make them even weaker than the outside stand-alone player. But alliance formation can still be bene…cial, as it prevents the strong players from heavily competing against each other, in which case they would fully dissipate their rents. 27 The exact threshold for q depends on the cost-sharing arrangement within a collusive alliance. 26 
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 Table 2 describes the equilibrium payo¤s in the continuation game if a coalition has been formed. To derive these payo¤s we have to distinguish two cases.
Here, the equilibrium mixed strategies F AB (x A + x B ) and F C (x C ) for the alliance AB and for player C, respectively, are given by
and
To con…rm that F AB and F C are mutually optimal replies, consider …rst player C.
With F AB as in (13), for all x C 2 (0; maxfV A ; V B g=2] we get
which is independent of x C . E¤orts x C > maxfV A ; V B g=2 lead to strictly lower payo¤; also, x C = 0 yields a lower payo¤. Therefore, for player C, any mixed strategy F C on (0; maxfV A ; V B g=2] is an optimal reply to F AB . Now consider player i as one of the alliance players i 2 fA; Bg. Let F C and joint e¤ort x A + x B be given. For x i 2 (0; maxfV A ; V B g=2 x j ), an increase in own e¤ort x i yields a marginal change in the own expected payo¤ equal to
Moreover, for x i > maxfV A ; V B g=2 x j , we get @E ( i ) =@x i = 1. 28 Accordingly, a player i with V i < maxfV A ; V B g yields his maximum expected payo¤ for x i = 0, and a player i with V i = maxfV A ; V B g is indi¤erent to an increase in x A + x B inside the equilibrium support of F AB . Therefore, suppose …rst that V i = maxfV A ; V B g > V j . Given F C (x C ), x j = 0 is a dominant strategy for player j; for player i, randomization according to F AB (x) is an optimal reply to F C (x) and x j = 0. If instead V i = maxfV A ; V B g = V j then the coordination device applies: If i is in the role of contributor, randomization according to F AB (x) is an optimal reply to F C (x) and x j = 0. For the non-contributor j, x j = 0 is the best reply to F C (x) and an e¤ort of i chosen according to F AB . We assume that i and j perfectly negatively correlate their decisions to take the contributor role and each of them is in the contributor role in half of the cases. 29 Then the players'expected payo¤s can be stated as
for the contributor i 2 fA; Bg,
for the non-contributor j 2 fA; Bg, and
for the stand-alone player C. Case 2: 2V C maxfV A ; V B g. The mixed strategies F AB (x A + x B ) and F C (x C ) that are mutually optimal replies are
To con…rm this mutual optimality, consider …rst player C. Given F AB as in (17),
and strictly prefers any of these e¤ort levels to any higher e¤ort. Consider player i 2 fA; Bg and suppose …rst that V i = maxfV A ; V B g. Assume that x j 0 (to be justi…ed later). Given F C (x C ) as in (18) and x j = 0, i's expected payo¤ for
and is smaller elsewhere. Accordingly, i is indi¤erent between all x i in the equilibrium support and may choose x i to generate F AB (x) given x j = 0. To con…rm that x j = 0 is optimal to F C and the choice of i, note that j's expected payo¤ for
Thus,
which is strictly negative for V j V i . (Moreover, @E ( j ) =@x j = 1 for x j > V C .) Thus, x j = 0 is j's best reply to F C and to a choice of i according to F AB . As in case 1, if V i > V j , this yields a unique equilibrium in which only i is active and randomizes according to F AB . If V i = V j , the coordination device assigns the roles of contributor and non-contributor with equal probabilities to i and j; the contributor randomizes according to F AB and the non-contributor chooses an e¤ort of zero (which is his optimal reply). Expected payo¤s in the candidate equilibrium are
for the non-contributor j 2 fA; Bg, and E ( C ) = 0
for the stand-alone player C.
Using the results in cases 1 and 2, the expected payo¤s as a function of the players' valuations follow directly. Recall that V C = M . Thus, if V A = V B < 2M then (15) and (16) imply that (19) and (20) yield
If V A 6 = V B and, for instance, V A > V B , (15) and (16) 
A.2 Proof of Remark 1
Suppose that if an alliance is formed, alliance members coordinate on a total e¤ort x A + x B which maximizes the total expected payo¤ of the alliance given by
otherwise. all-pay auction for two strategic players with valuations V AB = V A =2 + V B =2 and V C , the unique equilibrium follows from Baye et al. (1996) , with expected equilibrium payo¤s as given in Table A. 1. Before deriving the equilibrium alliance formation choices we compare the total expected alliance payo¤ as given in Table A .1 to the expected payo¤s of an alliance which chooses the e¤orts non-cooperatively under complete information (Proposition 2; Table 2 ). Here, we have to distinguish di¤erent cases, but it is straightforward to verify that total expected payo¤ of a collusive alliance (as in Table A .1) is strictly higher than the total expected payo¤ under non-cooperative e¤ort choices (as in Table 2 ) if and only if at least one of the alliance players A and B has a high valuation and H is su¢ ciently large.
Part (i): Suppose …rst that V i = L. Then i's expected payo¤ when standing alone is zero and i will get at least zero when forming an alliance. In fact, if V j = H > 2M L, j 2 fA; Bg, j 6 = i, then the total expected alliance payo¤ under joint payo¤ maximization is strictly positive; depending on how i and j share the e¤ort cost (depending on the exact combination (x A ; x B )), i can achieve a strictly positive payo¤. Thus, players i with V i = L are at least weakly better o¤ for i = 1 than for i = 0. Now suppose that V i = H. If V j = H, then j = 0 in the candidate equilibrium and i's choice is inconsequential since no alliance is formed. If V j = L, however, i gets H M when standing alone and at most (H + L) =2 M < H M when forming an alliance which maximizes joint payo¤s. Therefore, for V i = H, i strictly prefers i = 0 over i = 1. Altogether, this shows that the type-1 equilibrium always exists.
Part (ii): From the previous paragraph it already follows that player i with V i = L is (weakly) better o¤ when forming an alliance than when standing alone. Therefore, we only need to consider the case of V i = H. If V j = H, then in the candidate equilibrium where j = 1, i can get a strictly positive payo¤ when forming an alliance but gets zero when deviating to i = 0. Assuming that A and B share the cost of alliance e¤ort equally in case of V A = V B , i's expected payo¤ in the alliance is (H M ) =2 (compare Table A .1). 30 If V j = L, however, i gets at most max H+L 2 M; 0 in the candidate equilibrium with i = 1, but gets H M if he deviates to i = 0. Thus, the type-2 equilibrium exists if and only if the probability that j is a low type is su¢ ciently low (that is, q is su¢ ciently high).
To determine the exact threshold above which the type-2 equilibrium exists, we have to make an assumption as to which equilibrium is selected in case an alliance is formed and V A 6 = V B . As an example, suppose that if V i = H > V j = L then i and j share the e¤ort x A + x B according to their relative valuations, that is, 
